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Introduction
A well known result of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) shows that, under certain homogeneity and separability assumptions on preferences, an optimal system of taxes for public-sector funding or for redistribution relies on direct taxation only. Deaton (1979) has shown that, if income tax schedules are restricted to be a¢ ne, the conclusion of Atkinson and Stiglitz remains valid under the additional assumption that preferences are homothetic in the consumption goods. Deaton's result plays a role in the literature on the undesirability of capital income taxation in the presence of an a¢ ne income tax schedule, e.g., Werning (2007) .
This note provides a new proof and an extension of Deaton's result. Whereas Deaton focussed on optimal a¢ ne income taxes, the analysis here 1 shows that,under his assumptions, any tax system with a¢ ne income taxes and nonuniform linear excise taxes is Pareto-dominated by a tax system with a¢ ne income taxes only and no excise taxes at all. The proof uses an argument that Kaplow (2006) and Laroque (2005) have recently developed to simplify the proof and extend the scope of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem itself. For Deaton's theorem, the argument provides a more direct access to the relation between the assumption that preferences are homothetic in the consumption goods and the requirement that the income tax schedule be a¢ ne. An allocation is a mapping t ! (c 1 (t); :::; c m (t); y(t)) that indicates for each t how much of each …nal good an agent with productivity parameter t gets to consume and how much of the intermediate good he has to supply. The allocation (c 1 ( ); :::; c m ( ); y( )) involves the aggregate consumption R c i (t)dF (t) of …nal good i and aggregate production R y(t)dF (t) of the intermediate good, where F is the cross-section distribution of t in the population. The allocation is feasible if
The Setup
If the inequality in (1) is strict, I will say that the allocation is strictly feasible. An allocation (c 1 ( ); :::; c m ( ); y( )) is implementable by the income tax schedule T ( ) with consumer prices q 1 ; :::; q m if, for every t; (c 1 (t); :::; c m (t); y(t)) maximizes the utility of a person with productivity parameter t under the budget constraint
Trivially, an allocation that is implementable by an income tax schedule T ( ) with consumer prices q 1 ; :::; q m is also incentive-compatible in the sense that u(c 1 (t); :::; c m (t);
for all t and t 0 :
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), as well as Kaplow (2006) 
where v is continuous and ' is continuous and increasing: Under this assumption, the incentive compatiblity condition (3) is equivalent to the requirement that
where, for each t; w(t) := '(c 1 (t); :::; c m (t)):
Incentive compatibility depends only on the output requirement y(t)and the subutility w(t) that is given by (6) . Which consumption vector is used to achieve the subutility w(t) is irrelevant for incentive compatibility, but matters for feasibility. If …nal-goods consumption vectors can be rearranged so as to reduce resource costs while achieving the same subutility levels, one can replace the incentive-compatible and feasible allocation (c 1 ( ); :::; c m ( ); y( )) by a payo¤-equivalent allocation that is also incentivecompatible and strictly feasible. If the surplus that is thereby achieved can be used to raise utility levels without upsetting incentive compatibility, the allocation (c 1 ( ); :::; c m ( ); y( )) is strictly dominated. By the taxation principle of Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1995) , the payo¤-equivalent and the dominating allocation can both be implemented by an income tax schedule with the consumer prices p 1 ; :::; p m :
A Generalization of Deaton' s Theorem
In the preceding argument, there is no restriction on the tax schedule that implements the dominating allocation. To deal with the additional restriction that the tax schedule must be a¢ ne, Deaton imposes the additional assumption that ' is homothetic. Under this assumption, he shows that any allocation that maximizes welfare subject to feasibility and implementability by an a¢ ne income tax schedule must involve consumer prices equal to the producer prices p 1 ; :::; p m : The following result shows that, in fact, any allocation that is implemented by an a¢ ne income tax schedule with consumer prices that are not proportional to the producer prices is Pareto-dominated. This generalizes Deaton's theorem in the same way that Kaplow (2006) and Laroque (2005) generalized the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem.
Theorem 1 Assume that u takes the separable form (4) where ' is homothetic. Let (c 1 ( ); :::; c m ( ); y( )) be any feasible allocation that is implementable by an a¢ ne income tax schedule T ( ) with consumer prices q 1 ; :::; q m . If the consumer prices q 1 ; :::; q m are not proportional to the producer prices p 1 ; :::; p m , the allocation (c 1 ( ); :::; c m ( ); y( )) is strictly Paretodominated by another feasible allocation that can be implemented by an a¢ ne income tax scheduleT ( ) with consumer prices equal to the producer prices 
where w(t) is given by (6) . The allocation (ĉ 1 ( ); :::;ĉ m ( ); y( )) is payo¤ equivalent to the allocation (c 1 ( ); :::; c m ( ); y( )): Moreover, for any t; one has
Indeed, because u is strictly quasi-concave and di¤erentiable and because the consumer price ratios q i =q j are not all the same as the producer price ratios p i =p j ; the inequality in (8) must be strict. If the allocation (c 1 ( ); :::; c m ( ); y( )) is feasible, the allocation (ĉ 1 ( ); :::;ĉ m ( ); y( )) must be strictly feasible. I next show that the allocation (ĉ 1 ( ); :::;ĉ m ( ); y( )) can be implemented by an a¢ ne income tax scheduleT ( ); with consumer prices equal to p 1 ; :::; p m : I begin by specifying the scheduleT ( ): The assumption that (c 1 ( ); :::; c m ( ); y( )) can be implemented by the tax schedule T ( ) with consumer prices q 1 ; :::; q m implies that, for each t; the vector (c 1 (t); :::; c m (t)) maximizes '(c 1 ; :::; c m ) under the constraint that (2) hold for y = y(t): By the homotheticity of '; it follows that (c 1 (t); :::; c m (t)) and w(t) take the form c i (t) = (y(t) T (y(t))) i ; for i = 1; :::; m; and w(t) = (y(t) T (y(t)))'( 1 ; :::; m )
where ( 1 ; :::; m ) maximizes '(c 1 ; :::; c m ) under the constraint P m i=1 q i c i 1: Also by the homotheticity of '; the de…nition of (ĉ 1 (t); :::;ĉ m (t)) as the solution to problem (7) implies that (ĉ 1 (t); :::;ĉ m (t)) takes the form c i (t) = (y(t) T (y(t)))^ i ; for i = 1; :::; m;
where (^ 1 ; :::;^ m ) minimizes P m i=1 p i c i under the constraint '(c 1 ; :::; c m ) = '( 1 ; :::; m ):
Given the vector (^ 1 ; :::;^ m ) and given that the tax schedule T ( ) takes the form T (y) = 0 + 1 y; I writeT (y) :=^ 0 +^ 1 y; wherê
From the speci…cations of T ( ) andT ( ); one obviously has
for all t: From (9) and (10), one sees that, for any t; the vector (ĉ 1 (t); :::;ĉ m (t); y(t)) satis…es the budget constraint (2) when the tax schedule isT ( ) and the consumer prices are p 1 ; :::; p m : It remains to be shown that, for any t; u(c 1 ; :::; c m ; y t ) u(ĉ 1 (t); :::;ĉ m (t); y t );
for any outcome (c 1 ; :::; c m ; y) that satis…es the consumer's budget constraint when the tax schedule isT ( ) and the consumer prices are p 1 ; :::; p m . By the de…nitions of (^ 1 ; :::;^ m ) and of the tax scheduleT ( ) and by homotheticity, any such outcome satis…es 
Upon combining (13) and (14) and using the fact that the allocations (c 1 ( ); :::; c m ( ); y( )) and (ĉ 1 ( ); :::;ĉ m ( ); y( )) generate the same utility, one obtains (12).
To conclude the proof of Theorem 1, I note that, because u is strictly quasi-concave, the solution to the problem of maximizing u under the constraint (2) is unique and depends continuously on the parameters of the tax schedule. A small reduction in^ 0 can therefore be used to redistribute some of the surplus that is available under the strictly feasible allocation (ĉ 1 ( ); :::;ĉ m ( ); y( )). This makes everybody better o¤ without violating feasibility.
